2012-01-13

'German cities following Munich's open source example' | Joinup

'German cities following Munich's open source example' | Joinup

Suppose that several key cities in Germany, such as Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, Frankfurt--others, too--join Munich in moving, at least in part, their government offices to open source and open standards. What effect would that have on the Foss and open-standards ecosystems? For starters, once every time a major group migrates, it makes it easier for others. Not only does one--ideally--learn about what to do and not do, but also each migration spawns an ecosystem composed of small(ish) companies whose business is helping and supporting the migration. And this further aids the growth of the community, which increasingly includes contributors very interested in sustaining their business, solving client needs, and in making their own work easier by working with--collaborating--others to resolve bugs, add enhancements, and so on.

This is how a market is made, modulo 21st century technologies. It's not too different from any other time. A new technology or commodity or other product finds demand, and the suppliers rejoice, as do all the business people in the middle and periphery. Jobs are created, wealth, too, and it's overall a generally good thing, provided that the community (or in the plural) so established is able to sustain itself and is not simply a useful but temporary outgrowth of a larger business, one very much susceptible to the vagaries of the market.

For instance, here in Ontario, it seems that the largest industrial/manufacturing ecosystem depended--or depends--upon the US automotive industry. Sure, Canadians also drive these vehicles. But, as with so many other things Canadian, it really comes down to what the US buys. So, when the Lesser Depression began in 2008, and continued--continues--and the US automotive companies, once so mighty, once even defining the nature of the American economy, once they were shaken to the point of collapse, Ontario's manufacturing economy was bushwhacked. Poor planning had not provided for a real alternative, meaning that jobs lost to cars gone were jobs gone, at least until the car companies revived enough to resume their ways across the border. The point: The ecosystem up here was big and strong but depended upon the market strength of companies far removed from it and its concerns. The community so formed up here was intensely vulnerable. The solution is to establish a base that removes that vulnerability. But most cities around the world do not have the luxury of doing that. Yet some manage. Berkeley, where I pretty much lived half my life, was ridiculed by its neighbours--San Francisco, for instance, but also the much smaller and somewhat odd Emeryville--for not just ignoring the dot.com businesses of the 90s but for actually disdaining them, and favouring, instead, more or less failed efforts at re-establishing a manufacturing base by developing--way ahead of its time--electrical vehicles, for instance, as well as other things that were meant to provided *lasting* and less vulnerable jobs. The idea was not some Marxist fantasy. It was rooted in the clear perception that the dotcom boom was a bust waiting to happen and that a better future lay in making real things that real people would want because they really solved real problems. Cue to the present: Modern Web technology does not depend upon the mystery of the connection between the eyeball and the wallet. It uses Web and other Internet technology to connect, the represent and to build, and is not an end in and of itself. It's not about eyeballs--though my fellow community managers don't always seem to get this--it's about making things that last, using tools, such as the lowly mobile phone, that are now actually ubiquitous.


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